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THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S FIRST-TO-FILE BAR: 
JURISDICTIONAL OR NOT? 
Robert A. Magnanini 
Jason S. Kanterman 
INTRODUCTION TO THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND THE 
FIRST-TO-FILE PROVISION 
The False Claims Act (FCA)1 is the United States of America’s (the 
“Government”) “primary weapon” to combat fraudulent activity affecting the 
Government and American taxpayers.2 Recognizing that the Government 
would be unable to uncover all such fraudulent activity on its own, Congress 
enacted the qui tam provisions of the FCA, which rewards whistleblowers for 
reporting previously undisclosed fraud.3 Besides the psychic rewards of doing 
the right thing, righting a wrong, and saving lives, successful FCA cases can 
result in monetary rewards, sometimes even large monetary payouts.4 
Therefore, qui tam whistleblowers, known as Relators, have substantial 
incentive to present their claims on behalf of the Government. Because these 
rewards can be substantial, Congress recognized the need to place certain 
limits on the FCA to protect both whistleblowers and defendants from 
repetitive and unjustified use of the qui tam provisions. For example, Congress 
enacted the Public Disclosure Bar, which precludes receipt of an award by 
 
  Mr. Magnanini is the managing partner at Stone & Magnanini LLP, a complex litigation boutique 
firm representing both plaintiffs and defendants in matters throughout the United States, including representing 
Relators in False Claims Act matters and companies in compliance programs and matters. He has done FCA 
work for the last two decades and has been involved in some of the largest healthcare FCA recoveries to date. 
He is available for contact at rmagnanini@stonemagnalaw.com. 
  Mr. Kanterman is an attorney at Stone & Magnanini LLP. He maintains a nationwide complex 
commercial litigation practice, including focuses on whistleblower law and FCA litigation. Mr. Kanterman is 
the co-author of chapter 25 in the upcoming 2018 Edition of Developments in Business and Corporate 
Litigation, which discusses several issues surrounding FCA practice. He is available for contact at 
jkanterman@stonemagnalaw.com. 
 1 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. 
 2 Press Release, Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Cases in Fiscal Year 2010, 
Justice.gov, Nov. 22, 2010, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-recovers-3-billion-
false-claims-cases-fiscal-year-2010; Press Release, Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion From False 
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016, Justice.gov, Dec. 14, 2016, available at https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016; accord U.S. ex rel. 
Wood v. Allergan, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 772, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), interlocutory appeal pending, (2d Cir. 
2017). 
 3 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730. 
 4 Under the FCA, successful Relators receive a percentage of the Government’s recovery. 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(d). In many instances, depending on the fraud, the Government’s recovery can be billions of dollars. 
See https://taf.org/Public/Home_Page_Buttons/Top_100_Fraud_Cases.aspx. 
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Relators who present information that is substantially available in the public 
forum, e.g., information already disclosed in news articles or available to the 
public on the internet.5 Another of Congress’ limitations—and the one at the 
center of this article—seeks to prevent repetitive cases from being filed; this 
limitation is known as the first-to-file rule/bar.6  
While the general theory behind the First-to-File bar may appear relatively 
simple, properly and practically applying it is a difficult task.7 Though there 
are many complexities involved with First-to-File litigation, this article focuses 
on the current disagreement among the various circuit courts of appeals as to 
whether the First-to-File bar is a jurisdictional bar to litigation.8 This article is 
not intended to offer an exhaustive analysis or resolution to this issue, but 
rather, will simply introduce the current debate and offer initial thoughts on 
why the authors believe the First-to-File bar is a non-jurisdictional provision. 
Those seeking a more detailed analysis of the case law are encouraged to 
review, inter alia, Chapter 25 of the American Bar Association’s 2018 Edition 
of Developments in Business and Corporate Litigation.  
I. THE FIRST-TO-FILE BAR 
The first-to-file bar states that “[w]hen a person brings an action under [the 
FCA], no person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related 
action based on the facts underlying the pending action.”9  
Despite the statutory command that no person can bring a subsequent 
related action, in practice, Relators routinely bring related actions under seal 
and, therefore, do not learn until years into litigation that another Relator has 
filed a sealed case against the same defendant. This practical reality is largely 
due to the fact that, unlike more typical matters, actions brought pursuant to the 
FCA must be filed and investigated under seal, thereby concealing their 
existence from other Relators attempting to determine whether any other 
related action has been filed. As a result, it is not until a pending action is 
unsealed, or the Government alerts Relators in similarly-situated matters of 
competing cases by partially unsealing the cases, that Relators learn of any 
 
 5 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
 6 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 
 7 The Supreme Court has recognized that “qui tam provisions present many interpretive challenges.” 
Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. v. U.S. ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (2015).  
 8 Compare U.S. ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 2505 (2016) with U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 9 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 
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related actions. The question facing courts then becomes, since multiple related 
actions may be pending at any one time, and in different jurisdictions, how 
does the First-to-File bar impact those actions. 
II. Application of the First-to-File Bar 
The recent trend amongst the circuit courts aligns with the practical realties 
of qui tam practice, concluding that the First-to-File provision is not 
jurisdictional and requires reviewing all related actions at the time a First-to-
File objection is lodged.10  
In United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc.,11 the D.C. Circuit concluded 
that because the First-to-File provision does not explicitly state that it is 
jurisdictional in nature, it is not within the court’s province to expand 
Congress’ intent.12 Following the Supreme Court’s holding in Kwai Fun Wong, 
the court found that deeming the First-to-File bar jurisdictional would be 
improper in light of the fact that Congress did not clearly command the courts 
to do so. Absent a clear statement by Congress to apply a procedural rule as 
jurisdictional, the Court held that, “courts should treat the restriction as 
nonjurisdictional in character.”13  
In supporting its conclusion, the D.C. Circuit looked to the plain language 
of the First-to-File provision and the FCA as a whole, ultimately concluding 
that the First-to-File bar’s “statutory structure confirms what the plain text 
indicates[:] . . . [w]hen Congress wanted limitations on False Claims Act suits 
to operate with jurisdictional force, it said so explicitly.”14 “For example, while 
the first-to-file bar appears in a subsection labeled ‘Actions by Private 
Persons,’ a neighboring subsection is labeled ‘Certain Actions Barred’ and a 
number of those provisions are expressly couched in jurisdictional terms.”15 
Pointing to Section 3730(e)(1), the D.C. Circuit noted that Congress directed—
for that provision—that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action 
brought by a former or present member of the armed forces * * * against a 
member of the armed forces arising out of such person’s service[.]”16 The D.C. 
 
 10 See Heath, 791 F.3d at 119. 
 11 791 F.3d 112, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016). 
 12 See id. at 120–21 (quoting United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015) (“Courts 
should not lightly attach such drastic consequences to a procedural requirement. Instead, such rules will be 
held to “cabin a court’s power only if Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ as much.”)).  
 13 Id. (quoting Auburn Regional, 133 S. Ct. at 824). 
 14 Id.  
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1)). 
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Circuit found similar support in Section 3730(e)(2), which commands that 
“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought * * * against a 
Member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a senior executive branch 
official if the action is based on evidence or information known to the 
Government when the action was brought.”17 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit found 
that “Congress, in other words, knew how to reference ‘jurisdiction expressly’ 
in the False Claims Act if ‘that [was] its purpose.’ But it did not do so in the 
first-to-file rule.”18 As such, “[b]ecause nothing in the text or structure of the 
first-to-file rule suggests, let alone ‘clearly state[s],’ that the bar is 
jurisdictional, Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632, we hold that the first-to-file 
rule bears only on whether a qui tam plaintiff has properly stated a claim.”19 
A year later, the Second Circuit followed the D.C. Circuit’s lead in United 
States ex rel. Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co.20 Under a similar analysis, the Second 
Circuit concluded that  
Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion. Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 
249 (2010) (brackets omitted). Because the FCA “clearly state[s]” 
that other limitations on qui tam actions are jurisdictional, but does 
not “clearly state[]” that the first-to-file rule is jurisdictional, we must 
treat the first-to-file rule “as nonjurisdictional in character.” Auburn 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 824 (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 
515-16).[21] 
Diverging from the D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit’s opinions, several 
circuit decisions predating Heath and Hayes concluded that the First-to-File 
bar was jurisdictional, despite no explicit direction from Congress to 
implement the provision as a jurisdictional bar to litigation.22 These courts 
determined that the First-to-File bar is applied by looking at all pending 
actions, the date they were filed, and dismissing for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction those complaints filed after the initial, related action.23  
 
 17 Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(2)(A)). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. (emphasis added). 
 20 853 F.3d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 86 U.S.L.W. 3153 (Oct. 2, 2017). 
 21 U.S. ex rel. Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 853 F.3d 80, 85–86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 86 U.S.L.W. 3153 
(Oct. 2, 2017). 
 22 See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 23 See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d in part on 
other grounds sub nom., Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015); 
Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 2005); U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft 
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For example, in United States ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., the Fifth Circuit concluded that the existence of a first-filed FCA action 
divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction as to the later-filed, related FCA 
action.24 In reaching that conclusion, the Fifth Circuit turned to the historical 
lineage of congressional intent in drafting and amending the FCA, setting forth 
its view of Congress’ intent in enacting the First-to-File bar: 
The history of the FCA’s qui tam provisions demonstrates repeated 
attempts by Congress to balance two competing policy goals. On the 
one hand, the provisions seek to encourage whistleblowers with 
genuinely valuable information to act as private attorneys general in 
bringing suits for the common good. Id. On the other hand, the 
provisions seek to discourage opportunistic plaintiffs from filing 
parasitic lawsuits that merely feed off previous disclosures of fraud. 
Id. To promote the latter goal, Congress has placed a number of 
jurisdictional limits on the FCA’s qui tam provisions, including 
§ 3730(b)(5)’s first-to-file bar. Under this provision, if [the Relator’s] 
claim had already been filed by another, the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction and was required to dismiss the action.[25] 
Despite the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the First-to-File bar imposes a 
jurisdictional limitation, section 3730(b)(5) does not, on its face, support that 
conclusion; as explained by the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit, Congress 
never included in its statutory enactment the term jurisdiction. Further, inquiry 
into how the Fifth Circuit reached its conclusion is difficult, as the Fifth Circuit 
failed to explain its basis for finding that the First-to-File bar imposes a 
jurisdictional limitation on qui tam filings. Because the court did not identify 
how it reached its conclusion, we are left unable to analyze the validity of the 
court’s analysis. Notwithstanding, the majority of other circuits to have 
addressed the issue reached similar conclusions, likewise providing little 
support for their findings.26  
In what is arguably the most robust discussion of the issue by a court 
finding the First-to-File provision jurisdictional, the Fourth Circuit in United 
 
Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001); Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th 
Cir. 2004). 
 24 560 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2009).  
 25 Id. at 376–77. 
 26 See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d in part on 
other grounds sub nom., Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015); 
Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 2005); U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft 
Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001); Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th 
Cir. 2004).  
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States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co.27 concluded that the “first-to-file bar 
[i]s an absolute, unambiguous exception-free rule.”28 In the Forth Circuit’s 
view, “whoever wins the race to the courthouse prevails and the other case 
must be dismissed.”29 Upon defendant’s appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
Court granted certiorari and heard the case on its merits, partially addressing—
albeit not squarely—how to properly apply the First-to-File provision.30 While 
not directly on point, the Court’s discussion of the issue helps provide 
background and context on the question addressed in this article:  
The first-to-file bar provides that “[w]hen a person brings an 
action . . . no person other than the Government may intervene or 
bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending 
action.” 31 U.S.C. §3730(b)(5) (emphasis added). The term 
“pending” means “[r]emaining undecided; awaiting decision.” 
Black’s 1314 (10th ed. 2014). See also Webster’s Third 1669 (1976) 
(defining “pending” to mean “not yet decided: in continuance: in 
suspense”). If the reference to a “pending” action in the FCA is 
interpreted in this way, an earlier suit bars a later suit while the 
earlier suit remains undecided but ceases to bar that suit once it is 
dismissed. We see no reason not to interpret the term “pending” in 
the FCA in accordance with its ordinary meaning. 
Petitioners argue that Congress used the term “pending” in a 
very different—and very peculiar—way. In the FCA, according to 
petitioners, the term “pending” “is ‘used as a short-hand for the first 
filed action.’” Brief for Petitioners 44. Thus, as petitioners see things, 
the first-filed action remains “pending” even after it has been 
dismissed, and it forever bars any subsequent related action. 
This interpretation does not comport with any known usage of 
the term “pending.” Under this interpretation, Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), is still “pending.” So is 
the trial of Socrates. 
Not only does petitioners’ argument push the term “pending” far 
beyond the breaking point, but it would lead to strange results that 
Congress is unlikely to have wanted. Under petitioners’ 
interpretation, a first-filed suit would bar all subsequent related suits 
even if that earlier suit was dismissed for a reason having nothing to 
do with the merits. Here, for example, the Thorpe suit, which 
provided the ground for the initial invocation of the first-to-file rule, 
 
 27 For purposes of transparency, the authors represent Relator Carter in this action. 
 28 Carter, 710 F.3d at 181 (citing U.S. ex rel. LaCorte v. Wagner, 185 F.3d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1999)).  
 29 Id.  
 30 Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. v. U.S. ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1978–79 (2015). 
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was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Why would Congress want the 
abandonment of an earlier suit to bar a later potentially successful 
suit that might result in a large recovery for the Government? 
Petitioners contend that interpreting “pending” to mean pending 
would produce practical problems, and there is some merit to their 
arguments. In particular, as petitioners note, if the first-to-file bar is 
lifted once the first-filed action ends, defendants may be reluctant to 
settle such actions for the full amount that they would accept if there 
were no prospect of subsequent suits asserting the same claims. See 
Brief for Petitioners at 56-57. Respondent and the United States 
argue that the doctrine of claim preclusion may protect defendants if 
the first-filed action is decided on the merits, id., at 60-61; United 
States Brief 30, but that issue is not before us in this case. The False 
Claims Act’s qui tam provisions present many interpretive 
challenges, and it is beyond our ability in this case to make them 
operate together smoothly like a finely tuned machine. We hold that 
a qui tam suit under the FCA ceases to be “pending” once it is 
dismissed. We therefore agree with the Fourth Circuit that the 
dismissal with prejudice of respondent’s one live claim was error.[31] 
The Court’s analysis appears to support the conclusion that the first-to-file 
analysis may be affected by post-filing events, specifically, the status of 
earlier-filed complaints at the time the first-to-file issue is raised. Where 
earlier-filed complaints are dismissed, the Court’s holding supports the theory 
that later-filed cases may proceed, despite having been filed after the initial, 
related complaint. This conclusion contradicts the Fourth Circuit’s ruling that 
the First-to-File provision is an “exception-free rule” measured solely by who 
wins the race to the courthouse.32 
With the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Carter, First Circuit 
jurisprudence presents an interesting view into the current state of the law, and 
may preview how courts addressing the issue post-Carter may act. In 2014, the 
First Circuit cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lujan in holding that “[t]he 
FCA first-to-file rule is jurisdictional.”33 The First Circuit explained that “[t]he 
rule comes from the statutory prohibition that bars any ‘person other than the 
Government’ from ‘bring[ing] a related action based on the facts underlying 
the pending action’ in the FCA context.”34 The First Circuit then concluded 
 
 31 Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. v. U.S. ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1978–79 (2015). 
 32 Carter, 710 F.3d at 181 (emphasis added) (citing U.S. ex rel. LaCorte v. Wagner, 185 F.3d 188, 191 
(4th Cir. 1999)).  
 33 U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Inc.750 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Lujan, 243 
F.3d at 1187). 
 34 Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)).  
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that there is no exception to the First-to-File bar.35 In United States ex rel. Ven-
A-Care of the Fla. Keys, Inc. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the First Circuit 
reemphasized its conclusion that the first-to-file bar is jurisdictional, this time 
slightly expanding its discussion of the topic, while also recognizing the D.C. 
Circuit’s contrary position.36  
The following year, in United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 
the First Circuit changed course, noting that “the tectonic plates [had] 
shifted.”37 The shift in tectonic plates the First Circuit was referencing was:  
the Supreme Court[‘s] . . . decision [in] Kellogg Brown & Root 
Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015), 
which construed the phrase “pending action” as used in 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(b)(5). The Court held that, under the wording of the statute, 
“an earlier suit bars a later suit while the earlier suit remains 
undecided but ceases to bar that suit once it is dismissed.” Id. at 
1978. Accordingly, the dismissal of a section 3730(b)(5) claim 
ordinarily should be without prejudice, because the claim could be 
refiled once the first-filed action is no longer pending. See id. at 
1979.[38] 
In light of the Supreme Court’s directive in Carter, the First Circuit 
appears to have walked-back its earlier conclusion: 
Noting that we have described the first-to-file bar as jurisdictional, 
see, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Inc., 
750 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 2014), PharMerica suggests that the fact 
that the Relator’s claim was barred when brought prevents him from 
using Rule 15(d) to cure the jurisdictional defect. This suggestion is 
bolstered, PharMerica says, by the FCA itself, which provides that no 
one can “bring” an action based on the same facts as those 
undergirding a pending action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 
After careful consideration, we find PharMerica’s position 
untenable.[39] 
The First Circuit found that, despite the existence of a previously-filed related 
action, Relator could amend the complaint and potentially cure the first-to-file 
issue: 
 
 35 Id. (citations omitted). 
 36 772 F.3d 932, 936–37 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 37 809 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at *5–6. 
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[W]e think it manifest that the Relator’s case is well suited to a 
motion for leave to supplement. Developments occurring after the 
filing of the second amended complaint—the Carter decision and the 
dismissal of the Wisconsin action—have dissolved the jurisdictional 
bar that the court below found dispositive. Although the order of 
dismissal may have been proper at the time it was entered, the 
Relator timely appealed and the critical developments occurred 
during the pendency of that appeal. Consequently, this case is 
analogous to the cases in which a jurisdictional prerequisite (such as 
an exhaustion requirement) is satisfied only after suit is commenced. 
Under the circumstances, it would be a pointless formality to let the 
dismissal of the second amended complaint stand—and doing so 
would needlessly expose the Relator to the vagaries of filing a new 
action. We hold, therefore, that the Relator’s second amended 
complaint is eligible for the proposed supplementation.[40] 
Therefore, Gadbois presents an example of how circuits may handle this 
issue post Heath and Carter. Further litigation will tell.  
III. THE FIRST-TO-FILE BAR IS BEST VIEWED AS NON-JURISDICTIONAL 
Application of the First-to-File provision as an exception-free jurisdictional 
bar appears logically inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s directive in 
Carter. The procedural posture of Carter and similar situations proves 
instructive. For example, assume Action #1 is filed in 2014, alleging Fact X, 
which proves Hypothetical Corporation violated the FCA. In 2015, Action #2 
is filed, also alleging Fact X against Hypothetical Corporation. Assume that 
these actions are related. While both actions remain under seal, Action #1 is 
dismissed without reaching the merits of the case and the court orders it 
unsealed. Under the Fourth Circuit’s approach (and the approach of various 
other circuits), Action #2 would have to be dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, despite never being litigated on its merits. Under such an 
approach, defendants would potentially circumvent FCA liability. For 
example, a defendant who fears potential FCA liability could recruit a potential 
whistleblower to file a qui tam action alleging violations consistent with the 
areas in which the defendant fears potential liability, and then simply 
orchestrate dismissal. Such a scheme would, under the Fourth Circuit’s view, 
prevent any other Relator from successfully bringing a related action.  
While such actions may appear extreme, the potential penalties imposed by 
a successful FCA case may tempt such exploitations. For example, successful 
 
 40 Id. at *5–6. 
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qui tam actions may result in multi-billion dollar financial burdens on 
defendants. Worse, the FCA provides for potential debarment, by which 
defendants could lose the ability to bid on and service Government contracts—
a debilitating penalty for companies that rely heavily on Government contracts 
as part of their businesses.41 
Instead, the First-to-File provision should be viewed as a non-jurisdictional 
bar, consistent with apparent congressional intent. Congress, despite having 
deemed other provisions within the FCA jurisdictional, explicitly left out such 
language in the First-to-File section. As directed by the Supreme Court, courts 
should not deem a procedural rule jurisdictional absent clear direction by 
Congress to do so.42  
CONCLUSION  
Recognizing the differing approaches taken by the circuit courts of, this 
issue appears ripe for Supreme Court intervention. Until then, the issue must 
be analyzed on a circuit-by-circuit basis.  
 
 
 41 See generally Federal Acquisition Regulations, Subpart 9.4. Debarment, Suspension and Ineligibility, 
available at https://www.acquisition.gov/far/html/Subpart%209_4.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2017). For 
example, defense contractors and pharmaceutical companies are heavily reliant on Government contracts as a 
source of revenue.  
 42 Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632; Auburn Regional, 133 S. Ct. at 824. 
